{"id":43171,"date":"2017-08-30T05:48:18","date_gmt":"2017-08-30T05:48:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.biphoo.com\/bipnews\/?p=43171"},"modified":"2017-08-30T05:48:18","modified_gmt":"2017-08-30T05:48:18","slug":"donald-trump-north-korea-nuclear-weapons-presidents-alone-decide","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.biphoo.com\/bipnews\/news\/donald-trump-north-korea-nuclear-weapons-presidents-alone-decide.html","title":{"rendered":"Donald Trump, North Korea and nuclear weapons: Should presidents alone decide?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Donald Trump, North Korea and nuclear weapons: Should presidents alone decide?<\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n

Once again, the North Koreans have engaged in a missile test. Once again, President Trump has warned that \u201call options are on the table.\u201d And once again, Americans are nervously wondering what \u201call options\u201d means.<\/span><\/p>\n

Should the president of the United States have sole authority to use nuclear weapons? Even before North Korea’s recent provocations, we were long overdue for a debate on a question that carries existential risk for human civilization.<\/span><\/p>\n

Some Republicans are loath to support any move to limit the president\u2019s ability to use nuclear weapons, such as a current bill to first require a congressional declaration of war, in part because they view such moves \u2014 understandably \u2014 as a direct attack on Donald Trump\u2019s presidency.<\/span><\/p>\n

Many Democrats, meanwhile, have long opposed nuclear weapons in principle and could well be using public anxieties about Trump as a stalking horse for a larger agenda that includes the eventual abolition of nuclear arms.<\/span><\/p>\n

The question of control over the strategic deterrent is not, however, a discussion required solely because Trump is president. Nor is it time \u2014 yet, anyway \u2014 to eliminate the crucial role of nuclear deterrence in our national security. Rather, we need to think seriously about our system because it is predicated on assumptions that have been out of date for more than 20 years and are unsuited to the modern era.<\/span><\/p>\n

Every possible change, including leaving things as they are, seems fraught with risk. But let us begin with a modest proposal: There is no obvious reason, absent a crisis or military threat, to invest sole authority to use nuclear weapons with only one person.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nuclear hawks will object and note that during the Cold War, we entrusted a single leader with the key to the nuclear arsenal for many reasons \u2014 among them the need to maintain tight control over nuclear release and to respond rapidly in case of a nuclear attack out of the blue.<\/span><\/p>\n

We are no longer in constant danger of a surprise attack, however, nor are we facing a massive enemy coalition. Today, we have room to reform civilian control of nuclear weapons while continuing to foster the caution and uncertainty on which nuclear deterrence relies.<\/span><\/p>\n

The essential change would be to restrict the president\u2019s first use of nuclear arms in peacetime, while defining the circumstances that would return full and unitary control to the White House in order to deal with a crisis or other imminent danger.<\/span><\/p>\n

To that end, we could reorganize our day-to-day system of control to leave authority to engage in the first use of nuclear weapons with the president \u2014 but subject to the veto of one senior member of the legislative branch. I would nominate the Senate majority leader: He or she is a national figure who represents the deliberative body of Congress and cannot be dismissed by the president. The majority leader is also outside the line of presidential succession, and therefore does not stand to gain directly from any political crisis that might come from counteracting the president.<\/span><\/p>\n

This two-leader rule, however, would only govern the first use of nuclear weapons absent any other threat. Exceptions could be carved out in which the strategic deterrent would go automatically from relying on two sets of codes back to the current requirement for only one.<\/span><\/p>\n

For example, if U.S. Strategic Command determined that the United States was under attack of any kind, the act of communicating this warning could return unilateral nuclear control to the president. Congress could choose to allow other provisions in which control of the arsenal reverts entirely to the Oval Office: If NATO invoked Article 5 to provide a common defense, for example, or even if the president determined the need to elevate the national defense condition to a state of high alert (which would allow for rapid pre-emption of an enemy strike during a crisis).<\/span><\/p>\n

If we face a long period of hostilities, a president could propose an Authorization for the Use of Military Force, which would include granting the president sole authority to use nuclear arms. (This alone would impose a new seriousness on AUMF debates.) Such changes would involve Congress in the question of nuclear use, but without inviting chaos in a situation where deterrence demands calm and resolve.<\/span><\/p>\n

As a side effect, such arrangements would not only calm public concerns, but they might also force more bipartisanship and communication between the legislative and executive branches. And they might make the Senate \u2014 and by extension, the American people \u2014 think a bit harder about whom to elect as majority leader.<\/span><\/p>\n

These suggestions all have their drawbacks. But if we are to have a serious national discussion about the stewardship of our nuclear arsenal in the 21st century, we have to stop relying on default positions we inherited from the Cold War.<\/span><\/p>\n

Creating a more stable deterrent will require not only serious research and debate, but also some long overdue soul-searching on the part of an American public that has been loath to think about such things. The issue of presidential control is a good place to start.<\/span><\/p>\n

Tom Nichols, a Russia specialist and professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College, is the author of The Death of Expertise. The views expressed here are solely his own. Follow him on Twitter: @RadioFreeTom<\/span><\/p>\n

Source:-\u00a0https:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/story\/opinion\/2017\/08\/29\/trump-shouldnt-have-sole-authority-use-nuclear-weapons-tom-nichols-column\/610265001\/<\/span><\/p>\n

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